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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, Eugene L. Kimball, respectfully
petitions the Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter,
specifically with respect to the decision and opinion of this
Court filed on January 2, 1990, which reversed the judgment

of

the trial court.
This petition is presented in good faith, and not for delay.
Petitioner respectfully represents to the Court that:
1.

The Court's decision while stating sound principles of

law applies them to a different factual situation.
2.

The Court's decision on the issue raised by S. M.

Horman (herein Horman) and Banberry of "purchase" or "payment" of
the Banberry Notes to First Security creates a conundrum since
the issue of "purchase" or "payment" was and is mooted by the
actions of the parties and was not a proper issue before this
Court on appeal.

ARGUMENT
I
A - OMITTED FACTS FROM THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Hall spends
only one and a half pages in outlining the facts.

While it is

understandable that the majority of the facts which occurred in
the course of this litigation are not worthy of mention in the
court's opinion, the heart of the jury's determination as to
fraud and as to lien priority rests upon the defendants during
2

the lien litigation,

Reading

the facts as now stated

in the

court's opinion can only create bewilderment as to why the jury
would have ever found in favor of respondent Kimball in the first
place.

After

all, according

to the majority

opinion

First

Security and an unrelated trust merely entered into an agreement
concerning

some property

in Park City and did not communicate

this fact to respondent Kimball.

Why should a jury and a lower

court in making separate findings of equity be so excited about
such a simple transaction?
The opinion should be amended to enunciate that the October
1984 Purchase Agreement contained a number of unusual provisions
which

the

respondent

"badges of fraud."
which

took

this

Kimball

has previously

characterized

as

There were six separate unusual "red flags"
transaction

away

from

the normal

course

of

business dealing in which a senior lienholder is merely selling
its interest to an outside purchaser.

These are:

(1) The October Purchase Agreement was concealed
and kept secret - even the bank's own lawyers were
excluded from knowing the basis of the agreement and
the Agreement expressly contained a provision assigning
any risk of disclosure to Sidney Horman.
(2) The agreement did not occur during normal
business transactions but occurred during the Kimball
litigation.
Unlike almost all court proceedings the
defendants did not even make the existence of an
agreement known to the court — even assuming that the
facts of the agreement were confidential.
(3) The transaction was accomplished with false
statements of consideration since the $l f 600,000
certificate of deposit was admitted by the bank as a
false step without business purposes which the bank
admitted was solely to prevent the transaction from
being considered a payment of the first lien.
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(4) Rather than a normal business transaction the
transfer was disguised as something else.
The bank
kept possession of the First Security trust deeds even
though the payment for the loans was absolute and
unqualified. the bank was not to transfer possession
to Horman until after Kimball's equity of redemption
had passed.
(5) The bank stayed in possession of the loan and
the security and continued to pursue the foreclosure as
if nothing had occurred. If this were not a fraudulent
manipulation to extinguish Kimball's rights, the bank
would have recorded the proper instruments with the
county recorder.
(6) The Agreement is literally full of language
that denotes concern that the Agreement is a fraud and
specifically assigns to Horman all risk of discovery
and risk of losing insurance under the title policy.
The omission of this factual sequence which convinced both
the jury and the lower court that wrongful conduct had occurred
completely white washes the opinion of this Court and unjustly
casts doubt upon the wisdom of the jury and the lower court in
finding

the defendants liable for fraud.

This omission of

critical facts then allows the court in the legal analysis to
apply legal principles which are themselves sound but which
should not be applied to the factual context of this case.

B - ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority frames this appeal as follows:
The dispositive issue on appeal in relation to the
fraud claim is whether a duty existed on the part of
defendants to disclose to Kimball the existence and
content of the Purchase Agreement. (Slip Opinion, p.
3).
The Court then makes a detailed analysis of duties between
banks and

customers and

first and
4

second

lienholders and

concludes that no duty existed in this case to disclose the
Settlement Agreement.
The principles stated by the majority opinion are not
disputed by respondent Kimball.
the analysis of duty

Kimball completely agrees with

in disclosure matters

including

the

requirement of fiduciary relationships or dissimilar bargaining
power.

Furthermore, Kimball

lienholder

readily agrees that a senior

should not normally have to be concerned

about

affirmatively notifying a junior lienholder of its actions in
order to avoid claims of fraud or other actions.
Thus, essentially

the opinion of the Court is a well-

reasoned decision in applying general principles of law in the
banking-mortgage

industry.

The decision establishes useful

guidelines in the normal course of business for otherwise usual
types of transactions.

Unfortunately, however, all of these

noble principles stated in the majority opinion fail to recognize
the facts of this case which do not conform to the normal
banking-mortgage transaction.
These distinctions can be illustrated with two examples:
Assume that

ff H

F

the first lienholder negotiates with "T" a

third party who agrees to purchase the first mortgage of
debtor.

f, M

D the

In the normal course of business this transaction would

be reflected

in documents recorded in the County Recorder's

office and "T" would assume nF,f,s position.

In such an instance,

as noted by the majority opinion, it would be ludicrous to
require

f, H

F or "T" formally to notify the second lienholder, lfStf,
5

of this transaction.

"S" is capable of learning about it through

normal business channels and, in any event, has not been harmed
because of the transfer.
opinion

language

This example fits into the majority

governing

the

principles

behind

such

transactions.
However, as a second

example assume

facts which

analogous to what actually happened in the instant case.
f, ff

T

agree that

M

are

F" and

f, H

T will purchase the interest of "F" or, in the

alternative, will pay "D"'s obligation in full.

However, it is

expressly conditioned in the transaction that such payment or
purchase shall be kept secret until such time as "S" loses any
rights he may have to claim an interest in the property.

What if

this in fact had happened in the instant case and that respondent
Kimball was unable to exercise his foreclosure rights as a junior
lienholder because he was unaware that the first lien had been
extinguished.

This may well have occurred if the deception had

not been discovered during the litigation.
concealment
characterized

of

the

status

of

the

Can this deliberate

first

as a typical garden-type

of

lien merely

be

transaction

as

illustrated in the numerous cases cited by the majority opinion
in support of the "general11 overriding principles of law?

As we

noted in our opening brief any conduct to deprive a lienholder of
his lien by trick, cunning, device or deceit

is a fraud.

(Respondent's Opening Brief, p. 51).
Thus, the instant case is not a case involving the question
of whether a senior lienholder or debtor has an obligation to
6

inform a second lienholder of a transaction or event.

Instead,

it is a case involving an attempt on the part of the first
lienholder

and the debtor

fraudulently

to deprive a second

lienholder of his interest by manipulating the transaction in
such

a way

as

to cause an extinguishment

lienholder's rights.
identify

of

the

second

The failure of the majority opinion to

this issue completely distorts the conclusion and

completely obfuscates the findings of the jury and the lower
court by applying sound principles of law to a fact situation
involving extremely unsound business transactions.
The decision may have good precedential value containing
sound law and principles but, but we submit it is completely
inappropriate to what actually occurred below.

The only method

to correct this substantial problem is to vacate the present
opinion and to allow a rehearing in which the correct facts and
focus can be made.

II
THE ISSUE OF "PURCHASE" OR "PAYMENT OP THE BANBERRY NOTES WAS
NEVER A PROPER ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL
The parties to the Agreement of October, 1984, sometimes
referred to as the "Purchase Agreement" were First Security Bank,
First Security Financial (herein referred to as First Security or
FSB) and the Horman Family Trust.

The Horman Family Trust was

never a direct party to this action, nor was it involved in the
case except through the claim that S. M. Horman (herein Horman)
was the alter ego of the Horman Family Trust.
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This issue was

resolved by the jury's verdict that Horman was not the alter ego
of the Horman Family Trust, from which no appeal was taken.
The record discloses that the issue of purchase or payment
arose

following

the trial court's determination

that

the

agreement between First Security and the Horman Family Trust
should be produced.

In the joint pretrial statement Kimball

claimed that "The debts to FSB and FSF were fully satisfied in
October, 1984/* and "there was a merger of the FSB and FSF's
liens and title under the October, 1984 Agreement." (R. 2868).
First Security claimed "The October 3, 1984, Settlement Agreement
resulted

in no merger of title."

(R 2877).

And, Banberry

"adopts the defenses of FSB and FSF in regard to the October,
1984, Settlement Agreement."

(R. 2880).

Following the trial on the issues, the jury returned a
special verdict to the effect that Horman was not the alter ego
of the Horman Family Trust when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit
No. 1028) was made in October of 1984, and answered, "yes" to the
interrogatory with respect to whether the Purchase Agreement
constituted a "payment" from Banberry Crossing to First Security
Bank and First Security Financial of the Trust Deed Notes.
Following the entry of its Findings and Conclusions the
Court entered its Decree:
(1) That the liens of First Security Bank and First
Security Financial on the subject Banberry Property have
been extinguished.
(2) That the Trust Deeds of First Security Bank
and First Security Financial on the subject Banberry
Property may not be foreclosed.
8

(3) That the preliminary injunction heretofore
issued in this matter against Eugene Kimball and Keith
Garner enjoining them from administratively foreclosing
their deeds of trust on the subject Banberry Property
may be, and the same hereby is, dissolved.
(4) The First Security Bank and First Security
Financial are ordered to forthwith reconvey their deeds
of trust on the subject Banberry Property to the
appropriate Banberry entity.
Note that while this was an adverse ruling to the specific
contention

of First

Security,

it was a finding

Banberry since now Banberry's notes were "paid."

favorable

to

First Security

was directed by the Court to reconvey the property, which it did,
and did not thereafter appeal from the verdict of the jury and/or
the decree of the trial court.

Likewise, Kimball did not appeal

from the jury verdict and decision of the lower court that Horman
was

not

the

eliminated

alter

ego

of

the Horman

Family

Trust.

This

any party who might otherwise have had a right to

complain about the jury findings and the Court's decision on this
issue.
It is obvious that Banberry

had no basis for appeal from

the verdict of the jury and the decision of the court that their
notes to First Security were fully paid and discharged by the
"Purchase Agreement" since they no longer were obligated on those
notes.
It also appears to be a moot question, even though Horman
and

Banberry

raised

that

issue on appeal.

As an

individual

Horman has no standing to raise the issue, and Banberry likewise
could

not

to

raise

an

issue

as

to whether

the

transaction

involved a payment or a purchase since by the determination of
9

the jury that there was a payment, Banberry was

completely

discharged from any liability - the best possible position it
could be in.

In the case of Godesky vs. Provo City Courts, 690

P. 2d 541 (Utah 1984), this Court held that one party cannot
assign as error a ruling against a different party, where the
appealing party reserved no exception.

See also United Salt

Corp. vs. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, (N.M. 1981).
vs. Denwalt, 597 P.2d 756 (Okl. 1979).

Poteau State Bank

In this case, having been

relieved of any liability arising from the "Purchase Agreement"
by the determination that he was not the alter ego of Horman
Family Trust, Horman was no longer in a position to raise the
issue of purchase or payment.

Likewise, First Security who was a

party to the transaction and who may have raised the issue did
not do so on appeal, but followed the Court's Order and Judgment
by reconveying the property.
We recognize that this matter has not been specifically
presented

to the court prior

to this time, but under

the

circumstances of this case we believe that a Petition for
Rehearing

should

be granted

because

of

the

exceptional

circumstance which exist here in order to do substantial justice
and because of fundamental and jurisdictional issues.
We call the Court's attention to its recent decision in
Jolivet vs. Cook, 115 Ut. Adv. Report 17, 19 (Utah 1989), where
this

Court

stated

"we have held

that

in the absence of

exceptional circumstances, this Court will not entertain a claim
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raised for the first time on appeal."

(Emphasis added).

We

respectfully submit that exceptional circumstances exist here.
It is without question that both First Security and Horman
were proper persons to raise the issue of purchase or payment
when that issue was first raised by Kimball that the "Purchase
Agreement" resulted in a payment of the promissory notes of
Banberry to First Security.

However, that issue was resolved

against First Security which has not appealed to this court, and
second, Mr. Horman was found not to be the alter ego of the
Horman Family Trust, which likewise was not appealed to this
Court.
The issue is one of fundamental jurisdiction which is of
such importance that this Court may and should have raised the
question on its own Motion and should now do so in having had the
matter called to its attention.

A rehearing on this matter would

give the respective parties full opportunity to present their
positions and arguments.

CONCLUSION
In summary, it is respectfully requested that this Court
vacate the entire opinion and analyze it in light of the facts of
this case rather than the general law of disclosure between banks
and mortgagees.

While the opinion of the majority is certainly

an accurate synopsis of the legal obligations normally existing
in a commercial transaction, it does not properly focus upon the
issues involved in this case, involving the conduct of the
11

parties during the litigation of the liens.

We believe it is

certainly unfair and improper to use the present litigation as a
sounding board for generally accepted principles of law while, at
the same time, failing properly

to address the events and

circumstances of the case being litigated.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, it is respectfully
requested that a rehearing be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
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